Fire in the Hole: Inside the Preventable Death at Cook County Jail’s Division 8 RTU

Tier 5A of Cook County Jail’s Division 8 Residential Treatment Unit (RTU) is one of the most restrictive and volatile tiers in the entire facility. A punitive segregation unit for detainees with repeated infractions, it is known across the jail simply as “the hole.”

Under policy and basic correctional practice, no officer should ever be running dayroom on this tier alone, and no officer should ever leave a segregation tier unsupervised - especially during active movement.

But on the night of November 20, 2025, that is exactly what happened.

What followed was not merely a systemic failure.

It was a human failure, a leadership failure, and a cultural failure - one that ended a man’s life.

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I. A Dangerous Tier, a Broken Computer, and a Critical Abdication of Safety

According to officer reports obtained by C4, the sequence began when a detainee shackled to the dayroom table allegedly manipulated his restraints and freed himself. This occurred at the exact moment the tier’s assigned officer stepped off the unit to complete mandatory digital logs.

Why?

Because the computer inside Tier 5A had been broken for days and Cook County’s discipline-driven culture punishes missed digital log entries more harshly than it corrects broken equipment or unsafe staffing conditions. Officers are written up for failing to complete digital logs - even when the equipment required to do so is not functioning.

This created an impossible contradiction:

        •        Stay inside the tier → risk discipline for failing to log.

        •        Leave the tier → risk losing control and compromising safety.

The officer chose to leave.

But running dayroom alone on a segregation tier was already an unacceptable condition, and officers have the right - and the duty - to refuse unsafe assignments.

No refusal occurred.

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II. The Wick, The Flame, and the Order That Changed Everything

While the officer was off the tier:

1.          The detainee freed himself from the dayroom table.

2.          He reached the officer’s station - which would be impossible under normal supervision.

3.          He allegedly ignited a makeshift wick using an electrical source.

4.          The wick was passed into Cell 9.

5.          The officer observed a fire in Cell 9.

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When the officer returned, smoke billowed from the cell.

A 10-70 (fire in a cell) was transmitted.

Responding staff converged on Tier 5A -

and supervisors issued a single directive:

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“Do not open any doors.”

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This moment marks the beginning of frontline accountability.

Officers are trained - and legally obligated - to refuse unsafe or unlawful orders.

They are trained to intervene decisively when life is at immediate risk.

They know a burning cell requires immediate evacuation, not passive waiting.

Yet, no officer refused the order.

No officer forced entry.

No officer asserted command when sergeants hesitated.

This hesitation - and this adherence to a dangerous directive - is likely to cost some officers, sergeants, and the shift lieutenant their jobs.

Not because they intended harm.

But because they followed an order that prioritized procedure over life -

and in Cook County, someone must be blamed.

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III. OC Spray Inside a Burning Cell: A Decision that Demands Answers

Incident reports detainees inside Cell 9 were:

        •        combative,

        •        refusing to present their hands,

        •        obstructing extraction, and

        •        actively resisting commands.

Staff requested a cell fogger.

Then, despite active flames and heavy smoke, OC spray was deployed into the cell.

This decision requires serious scrutiny:

Why was chemical spray used when the occupants were already inhaling smoke, choking, disoriented, and trapped inside a burning environment?

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OC causes:

        •        airway swelling

        •        respiratory distress

        •        violent coughing

        •        disorientation

        •        panic

Inside a burning cell, those effects are not force options - they are life-threatening multipliers.

This decision escalated the danger, not the control.

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IV. The 10–15 Minute Delay That No One Can Defend

Based on reports, approximately 10 to 15 minutes passed between the initial fire and the opening of Cell 9.

In a fire, that is an eternity.

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This delay represents failures at every level:

•            Officers should have refused the “do not open the doors” order.

•            Sergeants should have overridden hesitation immediately.

•            Lieutenants should have taken command and ordered forced entry.

•            Administration created the conditions that made delay possible - understaffing, broken equipment, and fear-based decision-making.

By the time the cell was opened, one detainee was collapsing, losing consciousness, and spiraling into respiratory failure.

He later died at the hospital.

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V. The Policy Violation at the Heart of This Death

According to an internal staffing directive obtained by C4 — labeled “721.10 STAFFING” — Rehabilitation Units (RU), including Tier 5A, must be staffed as follows:

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721.10 STAFFING

a. Each unit holding individuals with serious mental illness (P3) shall:

 1. House fewer than 20 individuals;

 2. Be staffed with at least two sworn members.

b. All other rehabilitation units shall generally be staffed with at least three sworn members during 2nd and 3rd shift.

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Tier 5A:

        •        is an RU unit,

        •        was operating during 3rd shift,

        •        and had only one officer present moments before the fire.

Cook County Jail violated its own staffing policy.

That violation created the exact conditions that made this death possible.

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VI. No Level Is Innocent - But One Level Created the Conditions

To be objective:

Frontline Officers

        •        failed to intervene in an emergency

        •        obeyed a dangerous order instead of refusing it

        •        operated dayroom alone on a segregation tier

        •        allowed the fire response to stall

Sergeants

        •        hesitated instead of acting

        •        issued contradictory instructions

        •        failed to take command

Lieutenants

        •        reassigned an officer minutes before the incident

        •        failed to maintain proper staffing

        •        failed to override delays

        •        failed to coordinate a decisive extraction

Administration (Root Cause)

        •        failed to maintain adequate staffing

        •        failed to fix necessary broken equipment

        •        perpetuated culture of retaliation

        •        enforced obsession with digital logs

        •        prioritized discipline over safety

        •        prioritized chronic crosswatching and officer overextension

        •        failed and refused to retain staff

        •        failed and refused to enforce their own staffing policies

When you do not staff this jail, the jail runs blind.

And when the jail runs blind, people die.

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VII. The Story Beneath the Story

As more information emerges, one truth will overshadow every detail:

This death did not happen suddenly.

It happened in the minutes of hesitation,

in the orders that should have been refused,

in the leadership that never arrived,

and in the administration that built the perfect conditions for tragedy.

This did not happen because of one person.

It happened because an entire system failed at the exact same time.

C4 will continue monitoring this investigation and will report all verified developments as they arise.

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